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LAW NOTES
ENFORCEABILITY OF COVENANTS NOT TO COMPETE
CONTAINING UNREASONABLE, INDIVISIBLE
RESTRICTIONS AS TO GEOGRAPHICAL AREA
Contracts by which a business, a professional practice, or some
other property is sold or otherwise transferred are frequently ac-
companied by ancillary covenants, either incorporated in the original
agreements or made separately, which have for their purpose a com-
plete or partial elimination of the vendor as a competitor of the pur-
chaser.
The purpose of this note is to discuss the enforceability of such
agreements wherein the restriction upon the vendor not to compete
in a like business in competition with the purchaser has been found
to include an unreasonably large geographical area and is drawn in
indivisible form with the remainder of the covenant.
Agreements not to compete were generally regarded as unenforce-
able restraints of trade at early common law and void as against public
policy.' However, the leading English case of Mitchel v. Reynolds
2
qualified the doctrine by distinguishing between general and partial
restraints of trade, holding the latter enforceable if reasonably limited
as to the time and area restricted. Following this case fixed rules3
as to the conditions under which restraints were valid were followed
by both English and American courts until the evolution of the
modern rule: that in order to be valid a promise imposing a restraint
in trade or occupation ancillary to the sale of a business or practice
and its goodwill must be reasonable as to the territorial extent of
the restraint and the period for which it is to be imposed.4
It should here be pointed out that although this note deals pri-
1. Colgate v. Bacheler, Cro. Eliz. 872, 78 Eng. Rep. 1097 (1596); The
Blacksmith's Case, 3 Leon 217, 74 Eng. Rep. 643 (1587) ; Carpenter, Validity
of Contracts Not to Compete, 76 U. PA. L. Rzv. 244 (1927); Comment, 31
IOWA L. Rzv. 249 (1946).
2. 1 P. Wins. 181, 24 Eng. Rep. 347 (1711); Carpenter, Validity of Con-
tracts Not to Compete, ibid.; 5 WVILLISTO.N, CONTRAc'TS §§ 1634, 1635 (Rev. ed.
1937).
3. 17 C. J. S., Contracts § 241-245a, pp. 624-627 (1939).
4. Oregon Steam Navigation Co. v. Winsor, 20 Wall. 64, 66-69 (U. S. 1873);
Mattis v. Lally, 138 Conn. 51, 82 A. 2d 155 (1951); Delmar Studios of the
Carolinas v. Kinsey, 233 S. C. 313, 104 S. E. 2d 338 (1958); Somerset v.
Reyner, 233 S. C. 324, 104 S. R. 2d 344 (1958); Reeves v. Sargeant, 200
S. C. 494, 21 S. R. 2d 184 (1942); Metts v. Wenberg, 158 S. C. 411, 155
S. E. 734 (1930); Wood Mowing & Reaping Co. v. Greenwood Hardware Co.,
75 S. C. 378, 55 S. E. 973, 9 L. R. A. (N. S.) 501, 9 Ann. Cas. 902 (1906) ;
Carroll v. Giles, 30 S. C. 412, 9 S. R. 422, 4 L. R. A. 154 (1888); ANNrn'.. 46
A. L. R. 2d 119, 187 (1956); 17 C. J. S., Contracts § 246a, p. 627 (1939):
RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS §§ 515, 516 (1932); 5 WILLISTON, CONTRACTs §
1636 (Rev. ed. 1937).
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marily with covenants accompanying the sale of a business and its
goodwill, it is not necessary to the validity of a restrictive covenant
that it be ancillary to a sale of a business only: it may be valid if
ancillary to a sale5 or lease0 of property, to a contract of employ-
ment,7 to a pledge of corporate stock,8 to a license agreement and
transfer of patents, machinery, and equipment,P or to any other
lawful contract.' 0
It is essential that the covenant or contract by which the restraint
is imposed be incidental to and in support of another lawful contract
or sale by which the covenantee acquires some interest needing pro-
tection."1 Contracts which have for their object merely the removal
of a rival and competitor in a business are unlawful under all circum-
stances.'
2
The fact that the general rule is one of reasonableness, and hence,
relative in character, indicates that the result of each case must rest
upon the particular facts and circumstances of that case' 3 and that
identical limitations as to territory may be found to be reasonable
under one set of circumstances, but unreasonable under different
facts. The question of reasonableness is for the court, not the jury,"4
and in considering what is reasonable several basic concepts are
generally adhered to: the territorial restraint, in order to be reason-
able, (1) must be necessary in its full extent for the protection of
some legitimate interest of the promisee, (2) must not impose undue
hardship upon the person restrained, and (3) must not be injurious
to the public as a whole.' 5
A restraint which is unreasonable is illegal notwithstanding it is
but a partial restraint.' 0 Contracts containing promises found to
5. Tuzik v. Lukes, 293 Ill. App. 297, 12 N. E. 2d 233 (1938).
6. Vanover v. Justice, 180 Ky. 632, 203 S. W. 321 (1918).
7. Delmar Studios of the Carolinas v. Kinsey, 233 S. C. 313, 104 S. E.
2d 338 (1958).
8. John Lucas & Co. v. Evans, 141 Kan. 57, 40 P. 2d 359 (1935).
9. Voices, Inc. v. Metal Tone Mfg. Co., 119 N. J. Eq. 324, 182 Atl. 880
(1936).
10. John Lucas & Co. v. Evans, note 8 supra.
11. Stoneman v. Wilson, 169 Va. 239, 192 S. E. 816, 818 (1937).
12. 17 C. J. S., Contracts § 250, p. 633 (1939).
13. Henderson v. Jacobs, 73 Ariz. 195, 239 P. 2d 1082 (1952); Faust v.
Rohr, 166 N. C. 187, 81 S. E. 1096 (1914); Reeves v. Sargeant, 200 S. C.
494, 21 S. E. 2d 184 (1942).
14. Hood v. Legg, 160 Ga. 620, 128 S. E. 891 (1925) ; Aero. Bocker Corp.
v. Axelrod, 136 Misc. 521, 241 N. Y. S. 158 (1930); Norfolk Motor Exchange
v. Grubb, 152 Va. 471, 147 S. E. 214, 63 A. L. R. 310 (1929).
15. See AxNoT., 46 A. L. R. 2d 119, 149-151 (1956); 5 WILwaSTON, CoN-
TRAcTs § 1636 (Rev. ed. 1937) ; Reeves v. Sargeant, 200 S. C. 494, 21 S. E, 2d
184 (1942).
16. John T. Stanley Co. v. Lagomarsino, 53 F. 2d 112 (S. D. N. Y. 1931), 13
C. J. p. 475, note 476.
[Vol. I1I
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be unlawful because of too extended restrictive effect have not been
held so unlawful in their general purpose as to invalidate the whole
transaction of which thdy were a part.17 It follows that a contract
for the sale of a business which contains a covenant by which the
vendor agrees not to compete with the purchaser in a certain geo-
graphical area, the enforcement of which is found to be in unreason-
able restraint of trade, may be perfectly reasonable as to a part of
the territory included in the restriction. Will the courts enforce such
an agreement in part while holding the remainder invalid, or is the
whole agreement to be voided, the parties to be left as though they
had intended that no restriction accompany the sale?
ENFORCEMENT OF GEOGRAPHICAL RESTRICTIONS
TODAY
A. PREVAILING VIi1w
The prevailing view of the courts in this country today is that
in sustaining the validity of noncompetition agreements, partial en-
fbrcement may be had of geographically divisible restrictive covenants,
which are broader than necessary for the covenantee's protection, if
the part of the area in which enforcement would be reasonable is,
by the wording of the instrument, readily ascertainable.' 8 However,
the majority of the courts have held that the whole contract was
illegal and void where the restraint imposed was in excess of what
was reasonable and the terms of the agreement indicated no line of
division.19 Thus, under this rule it has been held that an agreement
by the vendor not to compete in the same county with the buyer of
his grocery business was unduly restrictive, and since it was indivisi-
ble, partial enforcement could not be had even as to the towns in
which the buyer operated his stores. 20
The traditional statement of the test of severability is the "blue
penciling" test by which the English courts severed a covenant if it
were so worded that the unreasonable elements might be lined out
17. Hall Manufacturing Co. v. Western Steel & Iron Works, 227 Fed. 588,
L. R. A. 1916C 620 (7th Cir. 1915).
18. Athletic Tea Co. v. Cole, 16 S. V. 2d 735 (Mo. App. 1929) (covenant
restricting competition in "Imperial, Missouri, and surrounding territory" held
enforceable only as to named city) ; General Bronze Corp. v. Schmeling, 208
Wis. 565, 243 N. W. 469 (1932) (covenant restricting competition in all
states but one, in Canada, and in Mexico.held enforceable only as to the forty-
seven states); RrsTA'rEmvNT, CONTRACTS, § 518 (1932); 5 WILLISTON, CoN-
TRACTS § 1659 (Rev. ed. 1937).
19. Consumer's Oil Co. v. Nunnemaker, 142 Ind. 560, 41 N. E. 1048, 51 Am.
St. Rep. 193 (1895).
20. Beit v. Beit, 135 Conn. 195, 63 A. 2d 161 (1948), but see 23 CONN. BAR
JouR. 40, 43 for criticisms by Professors Williston and Corbin.
1959]
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with a "blue pencil", and the remaining elements might be treated
as a separable enforceable covenant.21 Even though the covenants
are not separately stated, some courts supposedly following the pre-
vailing view have held a severance in the thought expressed in the
covenant to justify striking out or ignoring so much of the promise
in unreasonable restraint of trade, leaving the remainder of the cov-
enant valid and enforceable.22
B. MODtRN TRIXD VEW
The minority view has been that the legality of contracts in re-
straint of trade should not turn upon the mere form in wording but
rather upon the reasonableness of giving effect to the indivisible
promise to the extent that would be lawful. 23 The trend of the
more recent cases on the subject has been said to follow this minority
view whereby courts seek to impose reasonable restrictions con-
sistent with the intention of the parties, even though the expressed
terms of the agreement imposed a much greater restraint.24 Thus,
under this view, where a defendant sold his ice business to the plain-
tiff agreeing not to compete with the plaintiff in the area then covered
by that business or in four other cities for a certain period of time
but did re-enter the business in two of the cities covered in the agree-
ment during the restricted period, the court, although finding the
covenant to be unreasonable and unnecessary for the protection of
the purchaser as to time and territory, enforced the contract as to
those two cities in which the defendant engaged in competition with
the plaintiff.25
The modem view, which would allow partial enforcement even
though covenants are not divisible in form, is based on the logical
contention that "questions involving legality of contracts should not
depend on form," 2 6 but rather on "whether partial enforcement is
possible without injury to the public and without injustice to the
parties themselves." 27
21. Attwood v. Lamont, [19201 2 K. B. 146, 155; 5 WILLISTON, CONTACTS
§ 1659 (Rev. ed. 1937).
22. Edgecomb v. Edmonston, 257 Mass. 12, 153 N. E. 99 (1926).
23. 5 WsT.isro, CoNraTs § 1660 (Rev. ed. 1937) ; 6 CoRBIN, CONTRACTS
§ 1390 (1951).
24. Hill v. Central West Publishing Co., 37 F. 2d 451 (5th Cir. 1930) ; Yost
v. Patrick, 245 Ala. 275, 17 So. 2d 240 (1944); Edwards v. Mullin, 220 Cal.
379, 30 P. 2d 997 (1934); Ceresia v. Mitchell, 242 S. W. 2d 359 (Ky. App.
1951); Metropolitan Ice Co. v. Ducas, 291 Mass. 403, 196 N. E. 856 (1935);
Hartman v. Everett, 158 Okla. 29, 12 P. 2d 543 (1932).
25. Metropolitan Ice Co. v. Ducas, ibid.
26. 5 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1660, p. 4683 (Rev. ed. 1937).
27. 6 CoRBIN, CONTRACTS § 1390, p. 499 (1951).
[Vol. 11
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C. CRITICISMS OV SUCH VIEWS
One of the major objections raised by the majority of the courts
to the adoption of the view of partially enforcing a contract contain-
ing unreasonable terms which are indivisible is that purchasers pos-
sessing superior bargaining power would insist upon including the
most unreasonable restrictions in the contract, knowing that the
court will in any event enforce the covenant in part, if not in full. 2 s
It is urged, however, that this can be avoided at least in part by the
adoption of a rule which completely invalidates covenants deliberately
unreasonable and oppressive whether severable or not.2 9 Another
strong objection given by the courts to the adoption of such a view
is that a court cannot, where a promise is not clearly divisible, take
out so much as is objectionable since that would be making a new
contract to which the parties did not agree. 30 Those supporting the
modern trend take the view that the requirement of severance im-
poses no intolerable burden on the courts and that as a matter of
contract law such a rule better effectuates the intentions of the
parties. 3 ' A further objection made to the so-called modern trend
is that where the contract is indivisible and partially unlawful, it is
void sincd it is impossible for the court to determine which part of
the restraint induced the consideration.
3 2
The view represented by the modern trend is stated as the proper
rule by Professor Corbin3 3 and is now sanctioned by Professor Wil-
liston,34 although the opposite rule was adopted by the Restatement
of Contracts.3 5 Professor Williston criticized the prevailing view
by reasoning that if the lawful parts of a divisible contract can be
enforced, there is no reason why a contract indivisible in its terms
cannot be enforced to the extent that is legal. 3 6 Professor Corbin
agrees, and further contends that partial enforcement of an indivisible
agreement would involve much less variation from the effect intended
by the parties than would total non-enforcement.
37
28. 5 WILUSTON, CONTRACTS § 1660 (Rev. ed. 1937); Notes, 22 CORN. L. Q.
246, 248 (1948) ; 26 N. C. L. Rzv. 402 (1948).
29. 5 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1660 (Rev. ed. 1937).
30. Interstate Finance Corp. v. Wood, 69 F. Supp. 278 (E. D. Ill. 1946);
Automobile Club of N. J. v. Zubrin, 127 N. J. Eq. 202, 12 A. 2d 369 (1940);
Somerset v. Reyner, 233 S. C. 324, 104 S. E. 2d 344 (1958).
31. Note, 7 N. C. L. Rzv. 249, 258 (1929).
32. Johnson v. McMillion, 178 Ky. 707, 199 S. W. 1070 (1918).
33. 6 Cop.Brn, CONTRACTS § 1390, p. 500 (1951).
34. See 23 CONN. BAR JouR. 40 (1948).
35. RESTATFIMENT, CONTRACTS, § 518 (1932).
36. 5 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1660 (Rev. ed. 1937).
37. 6 CORniN, CONTRACTS § 1390 (1951).
1959]
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SOUTH CAROLINA VIEW
The South Carolina Supreme Court has held that "a restrictive
covenant not to compete, ancillary to the sale of a business and its
good will, will be upheld and enforced if (1) supported by valuable
consideration, (2) if reasonably limited as to time, and (3) if reason-
ably restricted as to the place of territory, that is, where the time is
not more extended or the territory more enlarged than for a reason-
able protection of the rights of the purchasing party.' '38
Although our courts have made it clear that they will not enforce
a claim based upon an illegal contract, 30 the plaintiff has been al-
lowed to recover in a case where the contract sought to be enforced
is separable from the illegal or unreasonable agreement.40
The Supreme Court of South Carolina, in the recent case of Somer-
set v. Reyner,4 ' came face to face with the question of whether or not
a covenant found to be unreasonable in its geographical restrictions,
but indivisible in its terms, should be partially enforced within such
an area as necessary for the protection of the business sold. In this
case, the seller of a jewelry business located in the city of Columbia
agreed not to engage in a similar business within the state of South
Carolina for a period of twenty years, but later did re-enter the busi-
ness within Columbia long before the expiration of that period. In
a suit by the seller for a declaratory judgment declaring the covenant
signed by him to be void, the Court found that the covenant was un-
reasonably broad in including a greater area than necessary for the
protection of the business sold, and that it was clearly indivisible as
it covered the entire state of South Carolina and furnished no basis
for dividing the territory. The Court therefore reasoned that the
whole agreement must be void and unenforceable and that the
Court could not render partial enforcement as to a reasonable area
necessary for the protection of the covenantee, since it would be
exceeding its power in that it would be making a new agreement for
the parties into which they did not voluntarily enter. In so holding,
the Court expressly followed the prevailing view in this country to-
day.
38. Metts v. Wenberg, 158 S. C. 411, 155 S. E. 734 (1930) (contract where-
by the seller of a barber shop agreed not to compete within the city of Orange-
burg during the next five years upheld as reasonable, though in partial restraint
of trade) ; Reeves v. Sargeant, 200 S. C. 494, 21 S. E. 2d 184 (1942) (covenant
held enforceable under which seller of photographic business, its tradename,
and goodwill agreed never again to engage in the same business within that
county).
39. McConnell v. Kitchens, 20 S. C. 430; Gist v. Telegraph Co., 45 S. C.
363, 23 S. R. 143 (1895).
40. Packard v. Byrd, 73 S. C. 1, 51 S. E. 678, 6 L. R. A. 547 (1905).
41. 233 S. C. 324, 104 S. R. 2d 344 (1958).
(Vol. I1I
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A similar result was reached by the South Carolina Court during
the same term in the case of Delmar Studios of the Carolinas v.
Kinsey,4 2 decided on North Carolina contract law since the contract
was entered into there, where the covenant not to compete was
ancillary to a contract of employment. The Court held the entire
covenant to be void and unenforceable since the terms were found
to be unreasonably broad.
Such holdings establish a rule in which enforceability depends on
form alone. Given two restrictive contracts containing identical pro-
visions, one may be enforceable and the other void, depending entire-
ly on the wording of the contract as a whole. The view under
which unreasonable, indivisible contracts are partially enforced to
the extent necessary for the protection of the parties results in much
less a variation from the effects intended by the parties than would
total nonenforcement. The very fact that the contract, to which they
mutually assented, calls for an unreasonable restraint clearly shows
that the parties intended for some restraint upon the participants and
usually implies their assent to the lesser degree being imposed by
a court.
South Carolina courts have found no insurmountable difficulty in
giving partial enforcement to contracts too broad in their terms in
other areas. Thus, where an agent acted in excess of his authority
in making a contract broader in its terms than he was authorized to
make, the court held the principal bound under the contract to the
extent of the agent's authority.4 3 It found that only that part in
excess of his authority was void and not the whole contract. Like-
wise, the South Carolina Supreme Court has held that if a vendor is
unable to perform the entire agreement, and can convey only part
of or a lesser interest in the property, he may be compelled, at the
election of the vendee, to convey that interest.44 It is impossible for
this writer to see such a distinction between the above mentioned
instances and those where the indivisible contract contains too broad
a geographical limitation that the courts can partially enforce the
contract in one instance and not in the other.
CONCLUSION
Where the parties involved in the sale of a business enter into a
covenant whereby the seller agrees not to compete in a like business
with the purchaser within a certain geographical area and for a
certain period of time, it is to be assumed that such an agreement
42. 233 S. C. 313, 104 S. R. 2d 338 (1958).
43. Walker v. Peake, 153 S. C. 257, 150 S. E. 757 (1929).
44. Moore v. Maes, 214 S. C. 275, 52 S. E. 2d 204 (1949).
19591
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was entered into for the protection of the goodwill of the business
purchased. Where the area contained in the agreement is found to
be wider than necessary to afford a reasonable protection to the
interests of the purchasing party and therefore injurious to the
interests of the public as a whole, and the covenant furnishes no
basis for dividing this territory, in many cases the refusal of a court
to enforce the agreement even to the extent necessary for the pur-
chaser's protection of his business interest has resulted in injustice
to him and reward to the defaulting covenantor, a consequence cer-
tainly against public policy, upon which ground these very covenants
are ruled void.4 5 A prime example of this injustice is found in the
recent case of Somerset v. Reyner,4 6 where the whole covenant was
declared void because its terms were found to contain unreasonably
broad restrictions, thus permitting the seller to resume his former
business within a close proximity to the business sold in the same
city and to thereby deprive the vendee of the goodwill that he had
purchased. The precise question presented in this case was a novel
one in South Carolina, and the court presumably could have adopted
and applied either of the existing views. If it had adopted the minori-
ty view, the Court would in effect be saying that the interpretation
and effect of a covenant embracing an unreasonably large area would
be that the covenant could not operate beyond reasonable limits.
This would not be making a contract for the parties: it would be
reading into the contract the unexpressed principle of law so adopted.
When an attorney draws up a contract containing restrictive pro-
visions as to the territory covered, he does so with the belief that
such terms are reasonable. Since the determination of what is a
reasonable restriction varies with the particular factual situation of
each case, it may be asked how are attorneys to know what is reason-
able and unreasonable when drawing these contracts? With the
South Carolina Court having adopted a view which declares the
entire covenant void when its terms are indivisible and are found to
be unreasonably broad, it becomes a gamble when, in drawing up
the contract, any territorial restrictions whatsoever are placed upon
the seller. The adoption of the view of partially enforcing an un-
reasonably broad covenant, indivisible in its terms, to the extent neces-
sary to the protection of the goodwill purchased would have pro-
vided a more just solution to the Somerset v. Reyner case, 4 7 as well
as to cases that may arise in the future.
45. Beit v. Belt, 135 Conn. 195, 63 A. 2d 161 (1948); Consumer's Oil Co. v.
Nunnemaker, 142 Ind. 560, 41 N. E. 1048, 51 Am. St. Rep. 193 (1895).
46. 233 S. C. 324, 104 S. R. 2d 344 (1958).
47. Ibid.
[Vol. 11
8
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 11, Iss. 3 [1959], Art. 4
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol11/iss3/4
1959] LAw Noms 351
The view that is the foundation of the modern trend has the merit
of protecting the purchaser's interests without placing an undue
burden on the vendor. This is not the making of a new contract by
the court, but is an equitable limitation on the extent to which the
court will enforce the contract as written. The trend towards this
view is grounded in more just and reasonable interpretation and
operation of partially illegal contracts in restraint of trade.
HARVEY G. SANDMRS, JR.
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